This paper proposes a nonintrusive encryption mechanism for protecting data confidentiality on the Web. The core idea is to encrypt confidential data before sending it to untrusted sites and use keystores on the Web to manage encryption keys without intervention from users. A formal language-based information flow model is used to prove the soundness of the mechanism.
Introduction
People store increasing amounts of personal data (emails, contacts, calendars, documents, photos and more) on the Web. Protecting the confidentiality of online personal data is critical. It is also challenging because many users have a high tolerance for insecurity, but a low tolerance for inconvenience. Websites share user-generated data with business partners and have vulnerabilities that may lead to information leaks, yet users ignore these risks and send confidential data to untrusted sites in order to use their services.
Our goal is to design a protection mechanism that is nonintrusive, in the sense that it does not blindly prevent users from accessing web services that on the surface involve sending confidential data to untrusted sites, and it requires little user intervention. The solution exploits a simple observation: many websites only need to store and/or forward users' data without interpreting or processing the data. For example, an online album service only needs to store photos on the server side. Therefore, if the album site stores a photo simply as a byte array, it is possible for users to store encrypted photos on the album site without affecting usability of the service. When accessing the album site, the user's browser can retrieve encrypted photos from the site, and decrypt and display the photos to the user. The challenge is to handle encryption and decryption with little user intervention.
To address this challenge, we propose a symmetric encryption scheme with transparent key generation and management. Keys are stored on the Web so that they are world-accessible. Then, encrypted data is augmented with the location of the key so that Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. the receiver of encrypted data knows where to get the key. As a result, end users are spared of the burden of generating, storing and securing encryption keys. Web applications can encrypt and decrypt data transparently, without affecting usability.
This nonintrusive encryption technique alone cannot ensure data confidentiality. We still need to ensure that encryption keys are not exposed to untrusted sites, that confidential data is not sent to untrusted sites in cleartext, and that cryptographic primitives do not introduce implicit flows [9] . These requirements can be satisfied using static information flow control [9, 16, 21] , which labels data with security levels and uses static program analysis to ensure the absence of insecure information flows: high-confidentiality data affecting low-confidentiality data. We imagine that the technique can be deployed on both the user's browser and on websites to check web application code at load time.
This paper combines the nonintrusive encryption technique and static information flow control, and presents a sequential securitytyped language (called Sweb) with cryptographic primitives. The type system of Sweb ensures that well-typed code does not explicitly or implicitly assign cleartext confidential data to untrusted storage locations (sites), satisfying a strong notion of confidentialitynoninterference [11] , albeit under some assumptions about the strength of the encryption algorithm.
Previous work [4, 24] has shown that a security-typed language with encryption primitives can enforce noninterference. These type systems have treated the result of encryption as public, which only makes sense if the encryption key is as confidential as the plaintext. This constraint may be too strong for the web environment where keys are stored online. In reality, a ciphertext is not necessarily made public. As a result, it is possible to relax the constraint. In the album site example, suppose Alice's browser connects to the album site through SSL. Then the encrypted photo is only readable by Alice and the album site. As a result, Alice's browser can store the encryption key on some keystore even if Alice does not trust the keystore site to access her photos, but does trust that the keystore site and the album site will not collude to leak her photos. The type system of Sweb formalizes this insight and results in more permissive typing than previous work.
The idea of splitting a secret into multiple shares for high confidentiality is well known [23, 22] . Our contribution is to apply the idea to typing the encryption primitive, formalize the confidentiality guarantee and prove correctness by showing that the type system enforces noninterference.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the nonintrusive encryption technique. Section 3 introduces the Sweb language. Section 4 discusses information flow control enhanced with encryption. Section 5 describes the type system of Sweb, and shows that it can enforce noninterference. Section 6 covers related work, and section 7 concludes.
Nonintrusive encryption
We propose the following nonintrusive encryption technique.
• Some websites, presumably more trusted than others, provide keystore services. A keystore maps identifiers to symmetric encryption keys, and a keystore service K provides two APIs: newkey(K) returns a pair i : k where k is a fresh key, and i is the identifier of k; K(i) returns the key mapped to i in K. Each keystore service is publicly accessible through a name K.
• The encryption primitive has the form encrypt(d, K), which obtains a new key k with identifier i from keystore K, encrypts d with k to obtain the ciphertext c and returns c.K.i as the encryption result.
• The decryption primitive has the form decrypt(c.K.i), which retrieves the key k from keystore K with identifier i, decrypts c with k and returns the plaintext.
Interestingly, this scheme does not provide a key generation primitive and every encryption operation implicitly obtains a new key from the keystore being used. The implicit key generation makes key management transparent and less error-prone. In addition, it practically achieves the same effect as the IND-CPA security (indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack) [7] , since an attacker can encrypt a chosen plaintext with the same key only once.
On the other hand, the treatment comes with the limitation that keys cannot be reused. But this limitation is bearable in the web environment, where storage is never the bottleneck. Suppose Alice makes ten encryptions every day, and each key takes 1000 bytes. Then all the keys that Alice needs in her lifetime take less than 500 megabytes of storage.
In addition, the encryption scheme is easy to deploy. With a secure email service (or other existing secure storage services), a browser extension can implement a keystore service straightforwardly. For example, suppose Alice trusts her Gmail account to keep mail confidential. Keystore alice@gmail.com can be implemented as follows:
• To implement newkey(alice@gmail.com), her browser generates a new key k and a random identifier i, sends an email subject : i, body : k to alice@gmail.com through SSL (luckily, gmail.com can be accessed through https) and returns the pair i : k.
• To implement alice@gmail.com(i), her browser simply retrieves Alice's email with subject i from gmail.com and returns the email body.
Note that with session cookies or saved password, Alice's browser can access her Gmail account without her intervention, and thus the encryption and decryption operations can be totally transparent. As a result, Alice would be able to use an online album site safely, perhaps not even realizing that her photos are encrypted before being sent to the site and decrypted before being displayed in the browser.
The language
The Web allows users to store and retrieve data, and invoke computations, all through a global name space (URLs). These core web functionalities can be modeled by a simple imperative language (Sweb) with shared memory and functions. For example, let memory location m b represent user's browser output and let mfoo.com represent the web page http://foo.com. Then the assignment statement m b :=!mfoo.com models a browser access to the URL http://foo.com. Suppose function name f foo.com/cgi represents the CGI program at http://foo.com/cgi. Then statement call f foo.com/cgi mod-
Statements s :: In Sweb, a simple dereferencing expression !m might represent reading information from a remote website. Static information flow analysis can prevent a good machine from running code that leaks confidential information. But a compromised machine might still try to read confidential data from a remote host and then leak the data.
We assume that a run-time access control mechanism is deployed so that read requests from untrusted machines for confidential data would be rejected. In particular, a keystore would not send keys to untrusted machines, so a compromised machine is not able to obtain confidential data by corrupting code execution. Therefore, we can assume that code execution is safe on any server machine. Note that this assumption would not be valid if data integrity interacted with confidentiality as with robust declassification [27] . However, Sweb considers neither declassification nor data integrity.
Syntax
The syntax of the Sweb language is shown in Figure 1 . A reference r may be a memory location m, a function name f , or a keystore name K. In Sweb, a value may be an integer n, a memory location m or an encrypted value c.K.i where c is a ciphertext, and i is a key identifier. An expression may be a value v, a dereference expression !e (only dereferencing memory locations), or a decrypt expression decrypt(e). For a technical reason (avoiding expressions with side effects), the encryption primitive is formalized as a statement e1 := encrypt(e2, K), which encrypts the value of e2 using a key in keystore K and then assigns the encrypted value to the memory location that is the result of e1.
Other statements of Sweb include the assignment e1 := e2, the conditional statement if e then s1 else s2, the sequence s1; s2, the skip statement skip, and the call statement call f . The call statement supports recursive function calls, and thus Sweb does not include a loop statement.
Operational semantics
Let W represent a state of the Web, which is a finite map, mapping memory locations to values, function names to programs, and keystore names to keystores. A Sweb program s is evaluated in a (E1) Rule (S6) is used to evaluate encryption statement e1 := encrypt(e2, K). Suppose the result of e1 is memory location m, and the result of e2 is v, and W (K) is the keystore K, which is a tuple i : k, T , where i : k is a list of new identifier-key pairs that have not been used for encryption, and T is a key table mapping identifiers to keys that have been used to encrypt some value. The auxiliary function newkey(K) returns the first identifier-key pair in i : k, and K[i → k] returns the keystore obtained by removing i : k from the new key list and inserting it into the used key table of K. This keystore formalization avoids introducing a random key generator that would complicate the proof of noninterference.
Suppose newkey(K) = i : k. Then E(v, K) encrypts v with key k and results in a ciphertext c. We assume the encryption algorithm E is strong enough such that no information about v or k can be inferred from the ciphertext c. Again, to simplify the noninterference proof, we assume that E is deterministic. This assumption does not make the system subject to chosen-plaintext attacks because each key can be used only once for encryption.
In rule (S6), the new web state W is obtained by assigning the encrypted value c.K.i to m, and the keystore K[i → k] to K.
Example
As simple as it is, Sweb is expressive enough to model some real-world applications. Suppose Alice wants to buy something from an on-line store foo.com. To place the order, she needs to send her address and her credit card number to foo.com, which then contacts visa.com to charge her card and ups.com to ship the order. Suppose Alice does not trust foo.com to protect the confidentiality of her address and card number. Assuming ups.com and visa.com provide keystore services, the transaction can still be performed in the following way:
• After Alice fills in the order form, her browser gets a new key k1 with identifier i1 from ks.visa.com (the keystore of visa.com), encrypts her card number (modeled by a memory location in Sweb) with k1, and then sends ccard. This code first decrypts the encrypted memory location representing Alice's card number and assigns the memory location to mcard. Then it increments the value of !mcard by the order amount. Note that f visa.com/charge runs on the server of visa.com, which is trusted by ks.visa.com, and thus can read keys from the keystore. It is important that key-retrieving requests from un-trusted sites would be rejected by keystore ks.visa.com. As discussed later in Section 5, the ability of a keystore to keep keys confidential is specified by the type of the keystore and taken into account by type checking.
• The code of f ups.com/ship is as follows: maddr := decrypt(m ups.com/ship?addr ); call f internal.ups/shipping ; mtrack-num :=!mtrack-num + 1 First, it decrypts Alice's address. Then it invokes an internal shipping function to process the shipping order. Finally, it increments the tracking number, simulating the creation of a new tracking number.
Information flow control and encryption
Information flow control prevents high-confidentiality information from flowing to low-confidentiality locations. The concepts of high and low confidentiality are determined by labeling information and memory locations with security labels from a lattice L. Given two labels 1 and 2, if 1 ≤ 2 in L, then 1 represents a confidentiality level lower than or equal to 2. Users are labeled too. A user with label can observe any memory location with a label less than or equal to . Let L represent the confidentiality level of attackers (low users). Then is a low-confidentiality label if ≤ L, and a highconfidentiality label if otherwise.
For example, consider a statement m := e. Let m and e be the label of m and e, respectively. Then e ≤ m must hold. Otherwise, it is possible that e ≤ L and m ≤ L, and the statement assigns a high-confidentiality value to a low-confidentiality location.
Conventional information flow analysis works reasonably well for ordinary computation, but applying it to cryptographic operations poses some challenges that have not yet been satisfactorily addressed.
Addition and encryption
Consider an addition expression e1 + e2 with label l, where 1 and 2 are the labels of e1 and e2, respectively. Because both the values of e1 and e2 affect the value of e1 + e2, we conventionally require 1 ≤ and 2 ≤ to ensure that no information about e1 and e2 can be leaked through their sum. Using the lattice join operation ( ), the two constraints can be represented by 1 2 ≤ . Encryption makes things a bit more interesting. Consider the statement m := encrypt(e, K). Let K be the label of keystore K, and be the label of the value of m. According to evaluation rule (S6), a new key k is used to encrypt the value of e, and k is known to only users with label as high as K . Although the value of m is affected by k and the value of e, unlike the addition case, constraints K ≤ and e ≤ are not needed, because no information about the value of e and k can be inferred from the encryption result. Instead, the following constraint needed to be enforced because after encryption, the value of e can be computed from the value of m and k:
e ≤ K As discussed in Section 5, this constraint leads to more precise and permissive typing than treating the encryption result as public data.
Noninterference property
To show that information flow control is effective for protecting confidentiality, we need to define confidentiality first. A strong notion of confidentiality can be formalized in term of noninterference [11] , which intuitively means that high-confidentiality inputs cannot interfere with low-confidentiality outputs.
For Sweb, the inputs of a program are just the initial web state, and any web state resulted from program execution is part of the outputs. Thus, a program s satisfies the noninterference property if evaluating s under two web states with equivalent lowconfidentiality parts results in web states that also have equivalent low-confidentiality parts. In other words, low users cannot distinguish the two executions.
Clearly, the key to defining the noninterference property is to define the notion that two web states W1 and W2 are low-equivalent (written W1
With encryption, we have to consider more scenarios. Suppose W1(m) = c1.K.i1 and W2(m) = c2.K.i2. Suppose c1 = c2. There are still two cases that a low user cannot distinguish the two encrypted values. First, the low user cannot observe keystore K, and thus does not know the encryption key. Then ciphertexts c1 and c2 are just random bits to the low user and could appear in either execution. Second, the low user can observe keystore K, but the decryption results are low-equivalent. Thus, we have the following rules that recursively define the low-equivalent relation between values:
More subtly, it is not sufficient to consider the low equivalence for each individual memory location. Consider two low locations m1 and m2. Suppose
and c = c , and label(K) ≤ L. Then W1(m1) ≈L W2(m1) and W1(m2) ≈L W2(m2). However, W1 and W2 are distinguishable to low users, because the values of m1 and m2 are created by the same encryption operation according to W1, and by different encryption operations according to W2. Furthermore, we need to consider the case that W1(m1) and W1(m2) are different, but they can be decrypted by low-confidentiality keys, and their decryption results are the same.
Let W i,L (m) denote the value obtained by decrypting W (m) for i times, and each time the decryption key is low-confidentiality. Then we have the following definition: Definition 4.1 (W1 ≈L W2). W1 ≈L W2 if the following conditions hold:
• For any m1 and m2, if label(m1) label(m2) ≤ L, then for any
• For any f , W1(f ) = W2(f ).
Security type system
In Sweb, information flow control is achieved through type checking. The type system of Sweb ensures that any well-typed program satisfies the noninterference property and cannot generate illegal information flows at run time. This paper does not attempt to deal with termination and timing channels. Control of these channels is largely an orthogonal problem, and partially addressed in previous work [3, 20, 29] .
The types of Sweb have the following syntax: Let Γ represent a typing assignment, mapping references to types. A typing judgment of Sweb has the form Γ s : τ (or Γ e : τ ), meaning that statement s (or expression e) has type τ with respect to Γ.
The typing rules of Sweb are shown in Figure 3 . The interesting rules are (CIPHER), (DEC) and (ENC), while other rules are standard in terms of static information flow tracking [26, 12, 28, 6, 19] .
Notation ⊥ represents the bottom label. Suppose τ is β . Then notation τ ≤ represents ≤ , and notation τ represents β . Rule (CIPHER) checks encrypted values. Suppose K is the name of a keystore with label . Then c.K.i has type [τ ] if τ ≤ holds. The label constraint ensures that a user who is authorized to read the encrypted value and the key is also authorized to read the plaintext value with type τ .
Rule (DEC) checks decryption expressions. Intuitively, if e has type [τ ] , then the result of decrypt(e) should have type τ . In addition, information about the result of e can be inferred from the decryption result. Thus, decrypt(e) has type τ , ensuring its label to be as high as .
Rule (ENC) is used to check encryption statements. Consider statement e1 := encrypt(e2, K). The value of e1 is a memory location for storing the encrypted value, and e1 has type [τ ] ref 1 . The keystore reference K has type keystore ref ⊥ . The premise τ ≤ is based on the same reasoning as in rule (CIPHER): putting the ciphertext and the key together can recover the original value with type τ . The premise 1 ≤ is standard, protecting information about e1 from being leaked through the assignment to the memory location that e1 is evaluated to.
The premise ≤ τ is a superficial constraint, which is based on the intuition that it is unnecessary to encrypt a value with a key that is more confidential than the value itself. This constraint is introduced to simplify the proof of noninterference. It does not limit the expressiveness of Sweb because we can always assign a low-confidentiality value to a high-confidentiality location and then encrypt it using a high-confidentiality keystore.
The encryption statement has label stmt because both a memory location of label and a keystore of label are updated by this statement. This labeling prevents illegal implicit flows arising from encryption. For example, consider the following code:
if !ms then mp := encrypt(ms, Ks) else skip where the contents of ms and Ks are secret, and the value of mp is public. Because of the encryption, attackers cannot infer the exact value of ms from the value of mp after executing the code, but they are able to infer whether the value of ms is positive. This statement is not well-typed because mp := encrypt(ms, Ks) has type stmt p , and !ms has label s, and s ≤ p. The following code demonstrates the implicit flow related to updating the keystore:
if !ms then mes := encrypt(ms, Kp) else skip where the value of mes is a secret, but the content of Kp is public. Therefore, attackers can infer whether ms is positive from how many keys in Kp are used. Again, this statement is not well-typed because mes := encrypt(ms, Kp) has type stmt p .
Consider the web album example discussed in Section 1. The following Sweb code implements storing an encrypted photo (using keystore K alice@gmail.com ) on album.com: m album.com/ephoto := encrypt(!mphoto, K alice@gmail.com ) Suppose Alice trusts that gmail.com and album.com will not collude to leak her photo, but does not want gmail.com to be able to access her photo. Then the value of mphoto has a label such that ≤ gmail.com album.com and ≤ gmail.com. By rule (ENC), the above code is well-typed. However, the code would not be welltyped if the encryption result is treated as public data (with label ⊥) as in previous work [4, 24] .
Rule (SUB) is standard for subtyping. If term t (expression or statement) has type τ , and τ is a subtype of τ , then t has type τ .
The subtyping rules of Sweb are shown below:
Intuitively, it is safe to treat low-confidentiality data as highconfidentiality data, and a statement with only high-confidentiality side effects as one with low-confidentiality side effects.
The type system of Sweb satisfies subject reduction. The proof is standard and subsumed by the noninterference proof in Appendix A, so we simply state the theorem here. 
Noninterference theorem
Suppose s is a program, and W is the initial web state. The output of s is the trace of web states generated from evaluating s, W . The two executions s, W1 and s, W2 are indistinguishable to low users if any two traces T1 and T2 generated from evaluating the two configurations are low-equivalent. Based on definition 4.1, we can define trace low equivalence, which formalizes the notion of low-equivalent outputs. Intuitively, two traces are low-equivalent if they may be generated by the same execution (one trace appears to be the prefix of the other) from the perspective of low users. Formally, the low-equivalence relation between two traces is defined as follows (where notation T1 ≈ T2 means that T1 and T2 are equal up to stuttering): With the notion of low-equivalent traces, it is straightforward to define the noninterference theorem: Theorem 5.2 (Noninterference). Suppose Γ s : τ , and Γ W1 ≈L W2. If T1 and T2 are the two traces of evaluating s, W1 and s, W2 , respectively, then Γ T1 ≈L T2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Related work
Using static program analysis to check information flow was first proposed by Denning and Denning [10] ; later work phrased the analysis as type checking (e.g., [18] ). Noninterference was later developed as a more semantic characterization of security [11] , followed by many extensions. Volpano, Smith and Irvine [26] first showed that type systems can be used to enforce noninterference, and proved a version of noninterference theorem for a simple imperative language, starting a line of research pursuing the noninterference result for more expressive security-typed languages [12, 28, 6, 19] .
More recent work looked into security-typed languages with cryptographic primitives. Laud and Vene [14] presented a type system for enforcing computationally secure information flow in the presence of encryption. Askarov, Hedin and Sabelfeld [4] studied a language with encryption, decryption and key generation primitives, and showed its type system enforces possibilistic noninterference. In comparison, our work considers a rather distinctive set of cryptographic primitives that do not manipulate keys explicitly. Moreover, the type systems in those previous work treat encryption results as public data, and the treatment is too restrictive to handle the case that an encryption key is less confidential than the plaintext it encrypts. In contrast, the type system of Sweb assigns label to a ciphertext based on the label of the encryption key, leading to more permissive typing. The work of Askarov, Hedin and Sabelfeld used possibilistic noninterference to avoid masking implicit flows in ciphertexts. In our work, this issue is dealt with by considering the preservation of equality relation between corresponding ciphertexts.
Other work studied more abstract cryptography-related primitives. Smith and Alpízar [24] investigated a random assignment operator and showed a security-typed language with this operator enforces probabilistic noninterference. Their work also considered the encryption and decryption primitives, but also had the limitation of assigning the lowest label to encryption results. Vaughan and Zdancewic [25] considered abstract packaging operators that rely on both static and dynamic checking for information flow control.
Abadi [1] presented a basic concurrent language (the spi calculus) with cryptographic primitives and a type system for enforcing secrecy. Rather than modeling an information flow analysis, the typing rules of the spi calculus formalize the principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols.
Also related is work on connecting formal cryptographic analysis techniques and computational security models. For example, Abadi and Rogaway [2] proved the computational soundness of Dolev-Yao analysis. More recently, Backes and Pfitzmann [5] investigated a Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library and established the relation between symbolic and cryptographic secrecy properties for cryptographic protocols.
Jammalamadaka et al. [13] presented the gVault system, a cryptographic network file system built on the Gmail service. In gVault, encryption keys are generated and recomputed using user passwords, which is susceptible to dictionary attacks and requires a password recovery mechanism that may have usability issues. Moreover, it is not clear that the password-based key management can be applied to more complex web applications involving multiple sites.
Declassification constructs have been introduced in a few security-typed languages [17, 15] for intentional information releases. A typical use of these constructs is to release encryption results of confidential data to low users. However, a declassification mechanism is generally too powerful to allow any noninterferencelike assertion being made.
The sequential programming model for distributed systems with untrusted components was first used in the secure program partitioning work [30, 31] and later in the Swift system [8] . We use this model for its simplicity rather than because it makes programming distributed applications easier.
Conclusions
This paper presents a nonintrusive encryption mechanism for the Web. The core idea is to make key generation and management transparent, to achieve high usability. Although it prevents key reuse, transparent key management is practical for the Web environment since large number of encryption keys can be easily stored on the Web. This paper also proves the soundness of the encryption mechanism in the context of a security-typed language, which provides a permissive and flexible way of typing the encryption primitive, formalizing the observation that the confidentiality of a plaintext can be protected by keeping either the ciphertext or the encryption key confidential.
In Sweb, each encryption is assumed to take place with a new key. At the cost of a more complex dependent type system, one could imagine separating key generation from encryption, which would allow Sweb to be used to describe more sophisticated protocols. This is worth further investigation.
A. Noninterference proof
The noninterference result for Sweb is proved by extending the language to a new language XSweb. Each configuration C in XSweb encodes two Sweb configurations C1 and C2. Moreover, the operational semantics of XSweb is consistent with that of Sweb in the sense that the result of evaluating C is an encoding of the results of evaluating C1 and C2 in Sweb. The type system of XSweb can guarantee that C is well-typed only if the low-confidentiality parts of C1 and C2 are equivalent. Intuitively, if the result of C is welltyped, then the results of evaluating C1 and C2 should also have equivalent low-confidentiality parts. Therefore, the preservation of type soundness in an XSweb evaluation implies the preservation of low-equivalence between two Sweb evaluations. Thus, to prove the noninterference theorem of Sweb, we only need to prove the subject reduction theorem of XSweb. This proof technique was first used by Pottier and Simonet to prove the noninterference result of a security-typed ML-like language [19] .
A.1 Syntax extensions
The syntax extensions of XSweb include the bracket constructs, which are composed of two Sweb terms and used to capture the differences between two Sweb configurations.
The bracket constructs cannot be nested, so the subterms of a bracket construct must be Sweb terms. Given an XSweb statement s, let s 1 and s 2 represent the two Sweb statements that s encodes. The projection functions satisfy (s1 | s2) i = si and are homomorphisms on other statement and expression forms. An XSweb state W maps references to XSweb terms that encode two Sweb terms. Thus, the projection function can be defined on web states too. For i ∈ {1, 2}, dom( W i) = dom(W ), and for any
Since an XSweb term effectively encodes two Sweb terms, the evaluation of a XSweb term can be projected into two Sweb evaluations. An evaluation step of a bracket statement (s1 |s2) is an evaluation step of either s1 or s2, and s1 or s2 can only access the corresponding projection of the web state. Thus, the configuration of XSweb has an index i ∈ {•, 1, 2} that indicates whether the term to be evaluated is a subterm of a bracket expression, and if so, which branch of a bracket the term belongs to. For example, the configuration s, W 1 means that s belongs to the first branch of a bracket, and s can only access the first projection of W . We write " s, W " for " s, W •", which means s does not belong to any bracket.
The operational semantics of XSweb is shown in Figure 4 . It is based on the semantics of Sweb and contains some new evaluation rules (E5), (S8-S11) for manipulating bracket constructs. Rules (E1), (S6) and (S7) are modified to access the web state projection corresponding to index i. The rest of the rules in Figure 2 
Proof. By induction on the structure of s. The proof is largely similar to the one in the noninterference proof of Aimp [32] . We just show some cases here.
• s is e1 := e2. In this case, si is e1 i := e2 i, and 
It is easy to verify that this execution satisfies condition (ii).
• s is e1 := encrypt(e2, K). By the same argument as the above case.
• s is call f . Then si is also call f , and si, Wi −→ s , Wi where s = Wi(f ). Therefore, s, W −→ s, W .
Lemma A.5 (Adequacy). Suppose si, Wi −→ T i s i , W i for i ∈ {1, 2} are two evaluations in Sweb. Then for an XSweb configuration s, W such that s i = si and W i = Wi for i ∈ {1, 2}, we have s, W −→ T s , W such that T j ≈ Tj and T k ≈ T k , where T k is a prefix of T k and {k, j} = {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the sum of the lengths of T1 and T2: |T1| + |T2|.
• |T1| + |T2| ≤ 3. Without loss of generality, suppose |T1| = 1. Definition A.1 (Γ W ). W is well-typed with respect to Γ, written Γ W , if dom(Γ) = dom(W ) and the following conditions hold:
• ∀m ∈ dom(Γ). Γ ; W W (m) : Γ(m).
• For any f , Γ W (f ) : Γ(f ).
• For any K, if label(K) ≤ L, then W (K) 1 = W (K) 2.
• For any m1, m2 such that label(m1) label(m2) ≤ L, W Proof. By induction on the structure of e.
Theorem A.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose Γ s : τ , and Γ W , and s, W i −→ s , W i, and i ∈ {1, 2} implies τ ≤ L. Then Γ s : τ and Γ W .
Proof. By induction on the evaluation step s, W i −→ s , W i. The cases for rules (S5) and (S10) are trivial.
• Case (S1). In this case, s is if e then s1 else s2. By the typing rule (IF), we have Γ s1 : τ . • Case (S2). By the same argument as case (S1).
• Case (S3). In this case, s is call f , and s is W (f ). By rule (FUN), Γ(f ) = τ . Since Γ W , we have Γ s : τ .
• Case (S4). By induction.
